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LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE,
by Keith Syrett1
RIVKA BIRKAN
IN LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE, Keith Syrett
discusses the ethical and political problems inherent in decisions to ration finite
healthcare resources, where need and public expectation of costly treatments
exceed supply.2 As rationing decisions become more explicit, and the public
becomes increasingly aware that resource constraints impact healthcare
allocation, the government is increasingly challenged to distribute scarce
resources in a way that will be publicly accepted as legitimate.' Syrett argues
that public law adjudication-including judicial review of administrative
decisions and constitutional litigation-can help public decision makers devise
a legitimate method of rationing publicly funded healthcare resources within
the "developed world"' and stimulate deliberation within civil society. The
author discusses this first theoretically, and then compares his theory with cases
from the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa.
Syrett argues that commonalities between public law norms-specifically
transparency, accountability,' and reason giving-together with the
procedural justice model of "accountability for reasonableness" (AFR) in
healthcare rationing6 create an opportunity for courts to facilitate the process
1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 266 pages.
2. Ibid. at 43.
3. Ibid. at 100.
4. Ibid. at 13, 14, n. 53, 128.
5. Ibid. at 231.
6. Ibid. at 142-47. The AFR model was conceived by Norman Daniels and James Sabin. See
Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly: Can We Learn to Share Medical
Resources? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) [Daniels & Sabin, Setting Limits
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of legitimizing allocation decisions. The AFR model-adopted by the
globally influential, UK based, National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence'-is intended to assist government bodies to make healthcare
rationing decisions that the public will consider legitimate. ' The four AFR
requirements are 1) public accessibility to rationing reasoning and decisions;
2) relevance (i.e., rationales for allocation decisions rest on evidence, reasons,
and principles that all fair-minded people9 can agree are relevant to deciding
how to meet the population's diverse needs under necessary resource
constraints); 3) internal dispute resolution and appeals mechanisms, and an
opportunity for the government decision maker to revise a decision in light of
new evidence; and 4) voluntary or publicly regulated enforcement of the
other conditions. 0
Syrett says that courts can facilitate legitimate government decision-
making by assisting in the dispute resolution and appeal processes and by
enforcing the public access and relevance requirements. He adds that parties
will resort to litigation if internal dispute mechanisms are inadequate," and
that the courtroom can become a venue for deliberation over allocation
decisions. Judicial reasoning and argumentation, reason-giving requirements
imposed on governments,12and the publicity of decisions can improve
deliberation on specific rationing decisions and allow for informed debate
within civil society.
13
Syrett also contends that judicial review improves legitimacy by allowing
public decision makers to use their powers for the common good. Through
review of administrative decisions carried out by other public law mechanisms
(including tribunals, inquiries, ombudsmen, regulatory mechanisms, and
Fairly]; Norman Daniels & James Sabin, "The Ethics of Accountability in Managed Care
Reform" (1998) 17:5 Health Affairs 50 [Daniels & Sabin, "Ethics of Accountability"].
7. Syrett, ibid. at 107.
8. Ibid. at 100-10.
9. Ibid. at 104, citing Daniels & Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, supra note 6 at 44.
10. Syrett, ibid. at 102, 103 (discussing Daniels & Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly, supra note 6, and
Daniels & Sabin, "Ethics of Accountability," supra note 6).
11. Ibid. at 134.
12. Ibid. at 202.
13. Ibid. at 146.
BOOK NOTES 391
internal complaint systems"4 ), the courts can enforce a high standard of
procedural fairness within internal regulatory processes and internal dispute
resolution mechanisms;15 uphold democratic and constitutional values of
equality; 6 and invalidate enactments that are based on personal moral
preferences."
Syrett compares his theory with judicial decisions about health care
rationing in the UK, Canada, and South Africa. He argues that courts in the
UK and Canada are overly deferential and restrained in judicial review of
allocative decisions of government agencies, hospitals, and administrative
tribunals-especially where. the authority acknowledges financial constraints-
and are not living up to their potential to engage the government in
deliberation and respond to the legitimacy problem.
However, in rights-based adjudication founded on constitutional claims,
Syrett says Canadian and South African higher courts facilitate transparent
deliberation and legitimate decision-making through "dialogue" with
government decision makers. 18 The courts review the constitutionality of
government decisions and laws and require regulators to explain and justify
their reasonability. " Syrett commends South Africa's Constitutional Court for
helping to interpret the Republic's constitutionally entrenched positive
obligation on the government to provide medical care; 20 subjecting government
allocation decisions to a reasonableness standard;2 and, without prescribing the
remedy, assisting the other branches of government to establish the context of
their obligations.22
14. Ibid. at 127.
15. Ibid
16. Ibid. at 153, citing Carlos Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1996).
17. Syrett, ibid.
18. Ibid. at 200, citing Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between
Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)"
(1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75.
19. Syrett, ibid. at 202.
20. Ibid. at 223.
21. Ibid. at 219.
22. Ibid. at 218, 223-25, 243.
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Syrett encourages the judiciary to ensure legal accountability where there is
an alleged infringement of constitutional rights or abuse of administrative
powers. 23 He cautions, however, against courts crossing the line between
facilitating legitimate decision-making and usurping the role of the executive
and legislative branches. 2' He discusses Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General)25
as a case in which the unelected judiciary defeated the wishes of the elected
legislators (with respect to Quebec's Medicare program) 26 and criticises the
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